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시갈 "남북정상회담, 북핵해결-북한변화 가져올 것"

한나라당의 '대선용' 주장에 "역사적 의미 간과" 비판

한반도 전문가인 레온 시갈 미 사회과학연구소 동북아협력안보프로젝트 국장이 남북정상회담이 북핵 문제 해결 및 북한 변화를 촉발시키는 순기능을 할 것으로 전망했다.

시갈 국장은 31일 한반도문제 연구소인 노틸러스연구소 웹페이지에 올린 기고문에서 "남북 및 북미관계에 변화를 가져올 유일한 길은 남.북간, 북.미간 화해이며, 이번 남북정상회담은 이러한 화해를 진전시키고 북핵 포기 및 북한내에 변화를 가져올 수 있는 기회라는 점에 진정한 역사적 의의가 있다"고 밝혔다.

시갈 국장은 "일부 관측통은 이번 남북정상회담을 오는 12월 한국 대선에 영향을 미치려는 '조잡한 시도'쯤으로 간주하고 이를 무시하려 하고 있으나, 이는 이러한 역사적 순간의 의미를 간과한 것"이라며 남북정상회담에 대한 한나라당 등의 비판을 일축했다.

그는 "오랜 세월에 걸쳐 점진적으로 이뤄질 적대관계의 근본적인 변화가 있어야만 북한이 안심하고 6-9개의 핵무기를 만들 수 있는 양의 기존 플루토늄을 포기할 수 있을 것"이라며 "남북정상회담은 화해의 과정을 더욱 촉진함으로써 북한의 핵포기를 위한 6자회담 과정을 진전시키게 될 것"이라고 지적했다.

그는 이런 의미가 있는 회담을 노무현 대통령이 최대한 활용하기 위해서는 ▲김정일 국방위원장이 '시큰둥해지고 있는' 경제개혁'을 재추진할 의사가 있는지, 있다면 어떻게 도울 수 있을지 알아보고 ▲한반도 평화체제에 대한 김 위원장의 생각을 타진해봐야 한다고 조언했다.

그는 "이번 남북정상회담에서 노 대통령은 김 위원장과 핵문제를 협상하는 직접적인 방식이 아니라 한반도 평화체제를 논의함으로써 간접적으로, 북한의 핵무기프로그램의 종식 과정을 진전시킬 수 있을 것"이라고 전망했다.

그는 평화체제에 관해 "김 위원장의 생각이 협상가능한 것으로 판명되면 그것이 남.북한과 미국 3자가 서명하는 일련의 평화 합의의 기반이 될 수 있으며, 이는 북한이 열망하는 북한에 대한 일종의 외교적 인정이 될 것이고, 그에 따라 북한도 핵프로그램 포기의 발걸음을 더 많이 떼게 될 것"이라고 설명했다.

그는 조지 W. 부시 미 대통령이 북미관계의 완전정상화를 북한의 핵포기에 연계시켰으나 그 이전에라도 "남북정상회담에서의 각종 평화 합의들이 평화조약으로 가는 과도단계로서 정치적으로 유용할 것"이라며, 남-북-미국 3자가 체결할 수 있는 "각종 평화합의들"로 ▲군사 핫라인 ▲훈련의 사전통보 ▲군사교류 ▲상대측에 대한 정찰비행을 허용하는 '영공개방' 등의 신뢰구축조치들을 꼽았다.

그는 김정일 위원장이 현 시점에서 남북정상회담을 수용한 것은 "부시 대통령이 대북 화해로 정책전환을 했다는 인식때문"이라며 "김 위원장은 미국이 대북 적대관계의 종식으로 움직임에 따라 한국과 관계를 확대.심화할 태세가 된 것"이라고 분석했다.

미국 <뉴욕타임스>의 논설위원을 역임했고 주요 대학의 강단에서 활동해온 레온 시갈 박사는 북한과 한반도에 관한 저서를 10여권 펴내는 등 북핵 및 한반도 문제를 집중 분석하는 한편 미 외교협의회의 한반도 관련 프로젝트를 주도하는 대표적인 한반도 전문가다.

레온 시갈 미 사회과학연구소 동북아협력안보프로젝트 국장 ⓒ 미 사회과학연구소


다음은 시갈 박사의 글 전문.

"The Inter-Korean Summit: One Good Turn Deserves Another"
By Leon V. Sigal


For six years South Korean Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun sought a second inter-Korean summit meeting - without success. Why did North Korean leader Kim Jung-il agree to meet now? It is his way of acknowledging President George W. Bush's commendable about-face on North Korea policy. He recognizes that Bush has put the United States firmly back on the road to reconciliation with North Korea. With the US now moving to end enmity, the North Korean leader is ready to extend and deepen engagement with the South, which is the best way to accelerate internal change in the North. Some observers are dismissing the upcoming summit, now scheduled for October 2-4 in Pyongyang, as a crude attempt to influence South Korea's election, but they are missing the significance of this historic moment.

What can President Roh do to make the most of this historic moment? He can give new impetus to the process of reconciliation - and not only between the two Koreas.

He can probe whether Kim Jung-il intends to reenergize flagging efforts at economic reform, and if so, what he can do to help. He can also advance the process of ending the North's nuclear arms programs - not directly by trying to negotiate with Kim Jung-il on the nuclear issue, but indirectly by sounding out the North Korean leader on his hopes for a peace regime on the Korean peninsula.

North Korea's leaders have never agreed to a summit meeting with the South unless the US was improving relations with North Korea. When the US was taking steps to reconcile, they were ready to meet with South Korea's president, but whenever Washington backtracked, they spurned summit meetings, letting North Korean propagandists blame the US and its "hostile policy" for the lack of progress in North-South relations.

This pattern began with Kim Il-sung's drive, starting in 1988, to reconcile with all three of North Korea's lifelong enemies - the US, South Korea, and Japan. The elder Kim, in a meeting with former US President Jimmy Carter just before his death, agreed to Carter's suggestion of a summit meeting with South Korea's president. To him, a visit by a former US president was testament to a shift in US policy away from enmity. With the US on the road to reconciliation, he was willing to meet with South Korea's leader. He was also willing to commit himself to freezing and eventually eliminating his nuclear weapons program.

Neither effort reached fruition, in no small part because of South Korean and US actions. After Kim Il-sung's death, South Korean President Kim Young-sam dashed hopes for a summit meeting by launching a campaign to disparage his successor in hopes of destabilizing the North Korean regime. And no sooner did Washington sign the Agreed Framework in October 1994 than Republicans won control of Congress and denounced the deal. Unwilling to take on Congress, US President Bill Clinton's administration failed to keep its commitments under the accord, most significantly to "move toward full normalization of political and economic relations." The North retaliated in 1998 by beginning to acquire the means to enrich uranium and testing a Nodong missile.

In late 1999, heeding the advice of President Kim Dae-jung, William Perry put Washington back on the road to reconciliation. Knowing that Seoul was seeking an inter-Korean summit meeting, Washington promised Pyongyang to end sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act once a summit took place. It also gave the North a draft communiqu&eacute; saying neither government had "hostile intent" toward the other. This commitment to end enmity was issued when North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong-nok visited Washington the following July. With the US cooperating, Kim Jung-il was willing to host the first ever inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang and promised a return visit to the South. He also offered to end his medium- and longer-range missile programs.

Once again, hopes for a second summit and North Korean disarming did not come to fruition - this time because of President Clinton's temporizing over Kim Jung-il's invitation to come to Pyongyang and the Bush administration's refusal even to talk to North Korea, let alone negotiate in earnest, and instead threatening regime change or worse. Pyongyang retaliated by ramping up its acquisition of equipment to enrich uranium. When Washington ignored its offer to negotiate the enrichment issue in October 2002 and instead suspended shipments of heavy fuel oil, the North in turn restarted its plutonium program.

Last September, confronted with the North's 8-10 bombs' worth of plutonium and a nuclear test impending, President Bush decided to negotiate for a change - taking steps to reconcile with North Korea in return for steps by Pyongyang to halt its nuclear programs. When the US Treasury Department finally lived up to the US commitment to resolve the Banco Delta Asia issue, a test of good faith in Pyongyang, North Korea implemented its promised suspension of its plutonium program. By doing what Clinton did, Bush legitimized diplomatic give-and-take as bipartisan US policy, making it easier for his successor to follow in his footsteps. As Kim Jung-il told China's foreign minister on August 14, "Recently there have been signs that the situation on the Korean peninsula is easing."

President Bush, who has repeatedly cited the second summit as a test of North Korea's trustworthiness, now has confirmation that trust can be built - but only through mutual effort. And only a fundamental shift in political relations away from enmity - a gradual process that will take years - could reassure the North enough for it to yield its six-to-nine bombs' worth of plutonium.

President Bush has held out the possibility of signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, but only after North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons. Similarly, both President Bush and President Clinton have made full normalization of US relations with North Korea dependent on nuclear disarming. But peace agreements could be politically useful as interim steps to a peace treaty. Such agreements signed by the US, South Korea, and North Korea - the three countries with armed forces on the peninsula - could provide for confidence-building measures, like hotlines linking military commands, advanced notice of exercises, military exchanges, or an "open skies" arrangement allowing reconnaissance flights. One peace agreement that the North has long sought is replacement of the Military Armistice Commission set up to monitor the cease-fire at the end of the Korean War with a three-party "peace mechanism." That mechanism could be a venue for resolving disputes like the 1996 shooting down of a US reconnaissance helicopter that strayed across the DMZ or repeated incursions of North Korean spy submarines into southern waters, as well as for negotiating confidence-building measures (CBMs).

President Roh can use this opportunity to advance the six-party process by probing Kim's ideas for a peace mechanism and other confidence-building measures. If Kim's ideas prove negotiable, they could provide the basis for a series of peace agreements signed by the US and the two Koreas that could provide a form of diplomatic recognition the North desires. In return, that could elicit further steps by Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear programs.

For South Koreans to make the most of this second summit meeting, they must begin by appreciating its real significance as an opportunity to advance reconciliation with North Korea, which is the only way to end its nuclear ambitions and bring about much-needed change in the North.
김홍국 기자

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